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Abstract: Although citizens see representative democracy today almost unanimously as the 
most desirable form of government, the institutions of advanced industrial democracies gain 
steadily more criticisms. In this chapter, we pay attention to an (often) neglected perspective, 
namely the criticalness of political elites toward representative democracy. Drawing on the 
Belgian Candidate Survey, the results of our analysis suggest that candidates’ attitudes 
depend on how integrated they are in the current representative democratic system. Especially 
outsiders to the political system are more critical and, at the same time, more supportive for 
direct democratic arrangements. These findings invite to reconsider the power relations 
between critical and noncritical candidates in a representative system that remains unchanged 
despite the criticisms of a considerable number of both citizens and candidates.  
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Introduction: From Critical Citizens to Critical Candidates 
 
Although citizens see representative democracy today almost unanimously as the most 
desirable form of government, the institutions of advanced industrial democracies gain steadily 
more criticisms (Dalton 2004; Rosanvallon 2011). In this chapter, we pay attention to a crucial 
though neglected perspective in this regard, namely the criticalness of political elites toward 
representative democracy. It is indeed one thing to have critical citizens in a representative 
democracy, but it is quite another one to have critical candidates. A critical attitude from 
candidates would raise serious questions on the functioning of a representative democracy: 
Might the very actors who are supposed to make it work depreciate it? How can that be? At 
the same time, the absence of a critical posture among candidates is equally questioning for 
at least two reasons. First, an important opinion discrepancy would exist between citizens and 
those who seek to represent them. Second, democracy improves through debates fueled by 
criticism and the absence of these criticisms – including from candidates – would mitigate 
democracy’s dynamism. As Akkerman (2003, 157) puts it: “shifting attention to areas of discord 
rather than of concord can be positive for democratic debate.” 
For the last decades, scholars have intensively scrutinized the perspective of citizens 
and voters toward the evolutions of democracy (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton and Welzel 
2014). Norris (2011) speaks of ‘critical citizens’ whose attachment to democratic principles 
remains unbroken while they give a critical assessment of how democracy works. She qualifies 
the growing discrepancy between citizen expectations and government performance as 
‘democratic deficit’. Such confidence erosion has serious consequences for the functioning of 
representative democracy and the party-voter-candidate triad that lies at the ground of this 
book. Political parties experience increasing difficulties to attract members and many citizens 
do no longer identify with them (Wattenberg 2000; Van Biezen et al. 2012). Voters, in turn, 
disengage so that elections turnouts drop and with them the popular support that parliaments 
can base their legitimacy on (Dalton 2014). Candidates, finally, adapt their strategies toward 
more personalized, professionalized, and sometimes even negative campaigns which 
comprise ambiguous effects on the citizenry (Schmitt-Beck 2007; Fenno 1978). 
Another scholarship has scrutinized intensively political representatives, but with quite a 
different focus. Their profile (Vandeleene 2016), efficiency (Navarro et al. 2012), and selection 
inside political parties (Rahat and Hazan 2001) have been studied extensively. By contrast, 
less research focuses on candidates’ democratic preferences and their attitudes toward 
democracy. Existing studies mainly research the influence of electoral outcomes on 
candidates’ satisfaction with the current functioning of democratic regimes. Andreadis (2012) 
found, for example, that the percentage of Greek candidates overly satisfied with the 
functioning of democracy in their country varies depending on whether their party belongs to 
the majority or the opposition. In Sweden, Esaiasson et al. (2013) showed that representatives 
in privileged positions (members of an executive and chairs of parliament or committees) are 
more satisfied with the functioning of their country’s politics than backbenchers.  
Most interestingly, Bowler et al. (2006) conducted a comparative research in Australia, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand analyzing what conditions candidates’ 
satisfaction with how democracy functions in their country and to what extent this influences  
their attitudes toward electoral system reforms. They found that candidates who won the 
election or whose party entered the government develop a positive affect for current institutions 
and a resistance to change, which leads them to conclude that “winners are reluctant to change 
the rules that made them winners” (444). This is in line with the literature on strategic electoral 
reforms (Benoit 2004). 
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In the wake of this literature, the present chapter pursues the analysis of political elites’ 
attitudes toward the functioning of democracy. Given the increasing criticism toward 
representative institutions in advanced industrial democracies and the considerable challenges 
this poses to their functioning, the objective of this chapter is to examine (1) whether beside 
‘critical citizens’, there are also ‘critical candidates’ and if yes, (2) who these are and (3) if they 
support reforms toward more direct forms of government. 
The Belgian case is of wider interest in this prospect. Not only because Belgium is a 
laboratory for understanding politics among European countries (Peters 2006), but especially 
due to the elite-driven and consociational character of its representative democracy (Schiffino 
2003). In the Belgian ‘partitocracy’, finding political agreements is indeed the responsibility of 
elites and notably political party leaders (De Winter and Dumont 2006), while the 
consociational institutional structure relies on conceding something to every political party 
when searching for the famous Belgian compromise (Deschouwer 2012). In short, studying 
candidates in Belgium is of particular interest because elites’ attitudes are of  crucial importance 
for the functioning of the country’s representative democracy. 
What is more, the chapter’s focus on candidates is interesting insofar as the literature 
usually deals with MPs or executive office holders. This research enlarges the scope and offers 
a more comprehensive view on political elites by studying at the same time all those who aspire 
to hold public office and not only those who eventually succeed in doing so.  
The remainder of the text is organized as follows. We use the BCS data and proceed in 
four steps. We first identify in the literature the four main sources of criticisms to current 
representative democracies: (1) the incongruence between public decisions and preferences 
of the majority of the population, (2) the lack of participatory opportunities, (3) the declining 
relevance of political parties as democratic linkage, and (4) the general loss of citizens’ 
confidence. Second, we analyze for each of them whether candidates at an aggregated level 
supported or rejected these criticisms. Since our results show discrepancies and indicate that 
there are both critical and noncritical candidates, we build a general index of candidate  
Criticalness allowing further differentiation. Thirdly, we look for differences in attitudes among 
candidates using regression analysis. Our findings suggest that candidate attitudes toward 
current representative democracy depend on how integrated they are in the current 
representative democracy (their insider profile vs. outsider profile) and that especially outsiders 
to the political system are those who are critical. Fourthly, we try to assess whether candidates’ 
degree of criticalness is associated with a higher support for direct democratic arrangements. 
Our results suggest that critical candidates are indeed more sympathetic to the implementation 
of public consultation in Belgium. Eventually, we discuss these results to consider what the 
criticalness of some candidates adds to the current picture of critical citizens and the 
democratic deficit. 
 
Candidates’ Attitudes Toward Representative Democracy and Its Alternatives  
 
Four Sources of Criticisms Toward Representative Democracies 
 
Contemporary representative democracies face major challenges (Rosanvallon 2006; 
Papadopoulos 2013; Pharr and Putnam 2000). This is not new since democratic government 
has always been under critique and transformed over time (Manin 1997). In the current era, it 
is possible to identify different sources of criticisms toward Western representative 
democracies. For the purpose of our analysis, we group them in four main categories. Thereby, 
the aim is not to discuss their intrinsic validity but rather to scrutinize elites’ attitudes toward 
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them and hence to see whether the surveyed candidates are equally critical or not. In this 
subsection, we briefly discuss each of the criticisms. 
A first category of criticisms concerns the incongruence between public decisions and 
the interests of the majority of the population. One key principle underlying the contemporary 
use of elections is that officials represent those who voted for them and that, consequently, the 
political majority acts in the interest of the majority of the population (as opposed to the interest 
of privileged minorities or factions) (Held 2006; Hamilton et al. 1999 [1788]). Several scholars 
and political actors argue, however, that this principle is not seen as being achieved in many 
representative democracies. They describe politicians as being perceived as selfish and 
pursuing their material self-interest (Hay 2007) – both in qualitative and quantitative research 
analyzing popular attitudes toward politics (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Grossman and 
Sauger 2017; Braconner and Mayer 2015). These studies show that especially less favored 
categories of the population do not feel the government being run to the benefit of the majority. 
In the public sphere, two kinds of actors criticize the lack of congruence between the will of the 
people and the public decisions that are taken. On the one side, grassroots movements like 
the Indignados in Spain or Occupy Wall Street in the United States argue that current policy 
orientations are overwhelmingly in favor of powerful economical elites (Ancelovici et al. 2016). 
These discourses find echoes in academic works that stress the increasing political and social 
inequalities as well as the dominant role of business interest in the shaping of contemporary 
politics (Bartels 2016; Crouch 2005). On the other side, the incongruence criticism is also 
observable in the discourses of populist party leaders (Mudde 2007). They underline an 
opposition between what they call ‘pure’ people and ‘corrupted’ elites who govern. While all  
these criticisms are of course diverse and tap into different ideological traditions, they share 
the common claim that current decisions taken by representative governments do not reflect 
the interest of the majority of the population. 
A second category of criticisms concerns the lack of participatory opportunities. While 
the core idea of representative democracy is the delegation of power (Manin 1997), certain 
actors and theorists have accused this focus on the electoral act only for being too narrow 
(Barber 1984). For participatory democrats, citizens have the capacities to and should be more 
involved in the political community (Held 2006). Individuals, they argue, only become citizens 
when they deliberate and take decision about the future of the polity (Pateman 2012). 
According to this perspective, putting a voting bulletin in the ballot box is not sufficient. Instead, 
citizens should be an active part at every stage of the decision-making process. Over the last 
decades, these theoretical reflections have inspired the spread of institutions that aim to 
include lay citizens in politics beyond elections (Fung and Wright 2003; Smith 2009). The most 
standardized forms are participatory budgeting processes (Sintomer et al. 2016), deliberative 
mini-publics (Grönlund et al. 2014), and direct democratic tools (Ruth et al. 2017). These 
mechanisms differ in their design and potential influence on final political decision, but they 
share a common aim that is to develop opportunities for participation. Moreover, some studies 
have shown that this trend corresponds to a growing desire in the population (Neblo et al. 
2010; Jacquet et al. 2015; Inglehart 1997), underlining the criticism to the electoral 
representative model of democracy for insufficiently developing participatory opportunities. 
The third category of criticisms is connected to the declining relevance of political parties 
as democratic linkage. Traditionally, political parties are considered the key connection 
between voters and decision-makers in representative democracies (Müller 2000; Duverger 
1954; Sartori 1976). This holds especially true in a partitocracy like Belgium (Deschouwer 
2012; Mair 2008). However, the centralityimportance of such actors is challenged nowadays. 
In a context where voters become increasingly volatile and where the prevalence of traditional 
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ideologies decreases (Inglehart 1997; Drummond 2006), political parties remain important 
players but their function changes. The number of citizens who identify with parties 
decreases—jointly with their number of members (Wattenberg 2000; Van Biezen et al. 2012; 
Scarrow et al. 2000). According to the cartel model, parties are nowadays mainly catch-all 
enterprises, close to the state in order to secure resources and their presence in governmental 
teams (Katz and Mair 1995; Scarrow et al. 2000). The democratic contribution of political 
parties is contested since they do no longer constitute the major glue between the state and 
civil society, thereby losing their function of mass mobilization. As noted by Katz and Mair 
(1995, 22), the transformation of political parties implies that “democracy ceases to be seen 
as a process by which limitations or controls are imposed on the state by civil society, 
becoming instead a service provided by the state for civil society”. 
Finally, a last group of criticisms that can be considered a consequence of the three 
previous ones is the dramatically decreasing level of trust in representative government. 
Longitudinal analyses show declining confidence toward representative actors and institutions 
among inhabitants of Western democracies (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton 20132014). The 
extent of this decline can vary depending on a number of conjectural factors like corruption 
scandals. Cross-national long-term comparisons show, however, that the breadth of this 
pattern is common to almost every Western democracy (Dalton 2005, 20132014; Abts et al. 
2012). Political scientists have debated the source of this trust erosion intensely. One part of 
this debate focuses on the demand side, showing that value evolutions and growing 
expectations toward government as well as the changing nature of social capital have affected 
the level of trust in government (Inglehart 1997; Norris 2011; Putnam 1995). Another part has 
focused on the supply side by analyzing how factors like the spread of privatization, the rise of 
neoliberalism, and the imperatives of competitiveness in an era of globalization have shaped 
citizens global attitudes toward politics (Hay 2007). 
Despite their different focus, all the quoted studies underline the salience of citizens’ 
criticalness for the future of representative democracies. Citizens’ increasing distrust in those 
who are supposed to represent them raises indeed serious questions on both the stability and 
legitimacy of political systems and the functioning of representative democracy. 
 
How Critical Are Candidates? 
 
These four sources of criticisms adequately mirror the major grounds of citizens’ skepticism 
toward contemporary representative democracies. To assess whether there also exist 
candidates who share these criticisms and can hence be considered ‘critical candidates’, we 
need to scrutinize their attitudes for each of these four dimensions. In order to measure this, 
the four categories of criticisms have been translated into five indicators in the BCS 
questionnaire that correspond to the following affirmations. 
 
1. The congruence between public decisions and the preferences of the majority of the population 
has been translated into two indicators accounting for two poles in this dimension: 
1.1 Legislative responsiveness: “Legislation reflects the interest of the majority of citizens”. 
1.2 Legislative independence: “Special interests have too much influence on law making”. 
2. Participatory opportunities: “Citizens have ample opportunity to participate in political decisions”. 
3. Relevance of political parties: “Political parties are the essential link between citizens and the 
state”. 
4. Declining citizen confidence: “Our democracy is about to lose the trust of the citizens”. 
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For each of these affirmations, candidates had to indicate on a five-point scale whether 
they ‘fully agreed’, ‘agreed’, were ‘neutral’, ‘disagreed’ or ‘fully disagreed’. As the results in 
Table 12.1 show, the BCS candidates are somewhat skeptical toward the legislative 
responsiveness and many of them (41.9%) tend to disagree that legislation reflects the 
interests of the majority of citizens. At the same time, almost half (49.5%) sees the legislation 
as independent and not being influenced too much by special interests. When it comes to 
participatory opportunities, the BCS candidates are again skeptical and more (46%) tend to 
think that citizens do not have ample opportunities to participate in political decision-making. 
In turn, another rough half (47.9%) sees political parties as the essential link between citizens 
and the state. Finally, when it comes to citizens’ alleged confidence decline, a clear majority 
(68.9%) of the BCS candidates disagree and do not think democracy is about to lose citizens’ 
trust.1 
 
Table 12.1: Candidates’ attitudes towards the critical dimensions of representative democracy (%)2 
 Fully 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Fully Agree 
1.1. Legislative responsiveness 11.10 30.90 32.10 24.20 1.80 
1.2. Legislative independence (neg.)* 15.30 33.80 30.80 18.20 1.90 
2. Participatory opportunities 14.40 31.60 23.50 24.80 5.70 
3. Relevance of political parties 5.10 18.50 28.60 39.50 8.40 
4. Declining citizen confidence (neg.)* 22.10 46.88 20.10 8.50 2.60 
* These affirmations have been formulated negatively. 
 
While these trends offer a detailed view on the way candidates perceive each of the 
criticisms usually addressed to representative democracy, these results are only of limited 
meaningfulness. Not only are neutrality scores often as high as the others are but also do 
tendencies in favor and against the different affirmations remain ambiguous with many 
candidates on both sides of the scale – pointing to the possible existence of both critical and 
noncritical candidates. Therefore, what we need to know for further assessment is whether the 
same candidates are critical, neutral, or positive for each of the five variables. To assess the 
comparability of candidates’ positions, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha coefficient that 
measures the internal cohesion of candidates’ evaluations across the five variables.3 The 
coefficient corresponding to 0.69, we concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the data 
to consider candidates’ assessment of the five dimensions as internally cohesive.  
Since candidates tend to assess the five variables largely in the same way, we 
constructed a single overall indicator for candidates’ attitudes toward current representative 
democracy. All variables have been coded so that high values correspond to a positive attitude 
while a low value points to the opposite. By adding up each candidate’s scores of all five 
variables (ranging from 1 to 5) and after subtracting five points to facilitate the interpretation, 
we finally obtained a single overall indicator (ranging from 0 to 20) that allows evaluating 
candidates’ degree of criticalness toward representative democracy.  
                                                 
1 Candidates running for the regional or the federal level of power share the same views. We tested indeed for 
discrepancies between candidates for the regional and federal elections but no significant differences were found 
between their attitudes. We ran Analyses of Variance for each of the five dimensions and p-values were all 
comprised between 0.11 and 0.57 (df  = 1295). Moreover, we tested whether the federal-regional distinction 
changed something in the regression models of the next sections. It was neither significant nor did it change the 
measurements of other variables. 
2 The results were weighted based on party response rates and answer rates regarding the governance level 
(regional or federal) candidates were running for. 
3 To standardize the directionality, we reversed the coding of indicators 1.2 and 4. 
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Figure 12.1 gives an overview on the distribution of candidates on this new variable. The 
histogram plot shows quite an important variety of opinions, the average candidate being 
slightly critical with a score of 8.6 on our scale (10 is the middle point, while 0 is “most critical” 
and 20 “least critical”). More importantly, it shows that beside those who are not critical, a 
substantive part of candidates are. Hence, there are not only ‘critical citizens’ in Belgium but 
also ‘critical candidates’. Now, the question is who these are? 
 
Figure 12.1: Candidates’ degree of criticalness with representative democracy4 
 
 
Who Are Critical Candidates: Insiders vs. Outsiders? 
 
The reasons for a candidate to be critical can be quite diverse. They might share ordinary 
citizens’ attitudes and want to reform the current functioning of representative democracy. 
Alternatively, they might think, at least, that pretending so may be electorally rewarding. Now, 
what is the profile of these critical candidates? The degree of criticalness may be weaker if 
candidates own a secure position within the political system – in line with what has been 
observed for elites’ attitudes toward electoral reforms (Bowler et al. 2006) and their satisfaction 
with politics on the whole (Esaiasson et al. 2013). More specifically, we hypothesize that an 
important element distinguishing between critical and noncritical candidates is the degree to 
which a candidate has already been integrated in the political system, that is, if he is a so-
called ‘insider’ or rather an ‘outsider’ (Bowler et al. 2006). Thereby, being an in- or outsider can 
mean different things. To capture these, we use three indicators. 
First, we distinguish between professional and nonprofessional candidates, that is, those 
who indicated that politics is their sole and full-time occupation and those who indicated it is 
not. Insiders live off politics, just as Weber (1919) considered that politicians live from politics 
whenever it is their trade. They work as full-time representatives or in a political party. On the 
opposite, outsiders carry out political activities only on an occasional basis.  
Second, we distinguish between candidates from traditional and nontraditional parties, 
that is, between those who have traditionally been in government and participated to power, 
                                                 
4 The results were weighted based on party response rates and answer rates regarding the governance level 
(regional or federal) candidates were running for. 
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and those who do not. Thereby, the classic mass parties of the traditional left-right axis without 
new forms of organization were considered as traditional, the others as nontraditional. 
Third, we distinguish between candidates who already held an elected public office from 
those who did not. For this indicator, insiders were considered as candidates who have already 
been active at the heart of the representative system by exercising an office at the local, 
regional, national or European level. Outsiders have never held such a mandate.  
Based on the expectation that outsider candidates are more critical toward the 
functioning of democracy because they are less integrated in the political system, our 
hypotheses5 read as follows: 
 
H1: No association exists between candidates’ degree of criticalness and, respectively, 
their professionalism, their origin from a traditional party and the fact that they 
previously held an elected office. 
 
H2: Candidates that are professionals are less critical toward representative democracy. 
 
H3: Candidates who belong to a traditional party are less critical toward representative 
democracy. 
 
H4: Candidates who previously held an elected office are less critical toward 
representative democracy. 
 
We test the potential association between these explanatory variables and the newly 
constructed response variable with four different regressions (i.e., Ordinary Linear Regression, 
OLS): one to account for each of the three indicators assessing the in- or outsider status of a 
candidate and one integrating all of them. For that purpose, the indicators were operationalized 
(binarily) as follows. As professional candidates, we considered those who indicated being a 
“full-time politician” as well as MPs, government and party employees (1: N = 224, 0: N = 994). 
As traditional party candidates, we considered those belonging to one of the three traditional 
Belgian party families born in the nineteenth century – socialists, liberals and Christian-
democrats (1: N = 585, 0: N = 712). As previously elected candidates, we consider all those 
who had been previously elected at the local, regional, national or European level (1: N = 347, 
0: N = 950). In addition to these theoretically derived variables, we added three control 
variables: gender, age (continuous), and educational level (in four categories). In the absence 
of previous studies with clear findings on this topic, we added these three socio-demographical 
variables as control variables without theory-driven hypotheses. 
The results in Table 12.2 (cf. models 1, 2 and 3) indicate with at least 95% of confidence 
that being a professional candidate, coming from a traditional party, and having held elected 
office have a statistically significant relationship with candidates’ degree of criticalness toward 
representative democracy. We can thus reject H1, confirm H2, H3, and H4, and conclude that, 
based on the positive sign of the coefficients, critical candidates are foremost political 
outsiders, i.e. non-professionals, from non-traditional parties and not having held elected office 
before. In addition, critical candidates tend to have a higher education level (at least 
Bachelor’s). The effects of gender and education are ambiguous and cannot be associated 
with a clear tendency. The models’ overall strength is underlined by highly significant F-
statistics.6 Interestingly, while all three models are significant and contribute to explaining 
                                                 
5 Their numbering is consecutive throughout the entire chapter. H1 and H5 (cf. next section) are null hypotheses. 
6 Regression diagnostics were conducted for the four models. In the data, there is no evidence for multicollinearity 
among the explanatory and control variables (VIF tests are all > 2). However, there is some evidence in model 2 
and 4 for auto-correlation (Durbin Watson Statistics equal respectively 1.47 and 1.52). The models’ residuals are 
normally distributed with skewness between −0.33 and 0.15, and kurtosis between 2.81 and 3.01. Since some 
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candidates’ degree of criticalness, the highest amount of variability in criticalness can be 
explained by knowing whether a candidate comes from a traditional party of not (r2 = 18%). 
Even introducing all three explanatory variables in the same model does only add little to it. 
We did it in model 4 for comparative purposes, despite the fact that every explanatory variable 
captures on its own a different reality of the insider-outsider concept and should hence be 
considered separately.7 
 
Table 12.2: OLS regression results for candidates’ degree of criticalness 
 Model 1: 
Traditional party 
Model 2: 
Professionalism 
Model 3: 
Elected previously 
Model 4: 
Integrated 
 Estimated 𝛽i  SE Estimated 𝛽i SE Estimated 𝛽i SE Estimated 𝛽i SE 
Intercept 6.17*** 0.51 7.08*** 0.56 7.32*** 0.55    6.28*** 0.51 
Traditional party 2.77*** 0.18 - -  2.65** 0.18 
Professionalism -  0.65* 0.25 -  0.33 0.24 
Elected previously - -     1.36*** 0.21  0.59** 0.21 
Age 0.15* 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.00 0.01  0.01 0.01 
Gender (F=1, M=0)   -0.13 0.18   -0.11 0.20    -0.10 0.19   -0.15 0.18 
Education (prim.)       
Secondary 0.29 0.41  0.71 0.45  0.58 0.44  0.24 0.41 
Bachelor 0.94* 0.39    1.45*** 0.43  1.29** 0.42  0.90* 0.39 
Master 0.80* 0.37  1.29** 0.41  1.20** 0.40  0.61 0.38 
 Mtp. r² = 0.19 
Adj. r² = 0.18 
p(F-st.) <  2.2x10 -16 
df = 1174 
Mtp. r² = 0.02 
Adj. r² = 0.01 
p(F-st.) <  3.8x10 -4 
df = 1149 
Mtp. r² = 0.05 
Adj. r² = 0.04 
p(F-st.) <  6.3x10 -11 
df = 1174 
Mtp. r² = 0.20 
Adj. r² = 0.19 
p(F-st.) <  2.2x10 -16 
df = 1147 
p-values (>|t|): * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Critical Candidates and Direct Democracy 
 
Knowing who critical candidates are, is one thing, knowing what they want is quite another. 
During the last decades, several political actors and scholars have proposed to use articipatory 
tools to alleviate citizens’ disenchantment with representative democracy (Geissel and Newton 
2012). Among these proposals, direct democratic tools have been extensively discussed 
because they complement representative democracy with directly citizen-driven decision-
making (Ruth et al. 2017). It is hence interesting to see what candidates think of the most 
prominently proposed alternative to purely representative democracy and to assess whether a 
difference of support exists between critical and non-critical candidates. 
Based on the expectation that critical candidates are more skeptical toward 
representative 
democracy and hence potentially more open to more direct forms of democratic decision-
making, our hypotheses read as follows: 
 
H5:  No association exists between candidates’ degree of criticalness toward 
representative democracy and their support for direct democratic decision-making. 
 
H6: Candidates who are more critical toward representative democracy are more 
supportive toward direct democratic decision-making. 
 
                                                 
heteroscedasticity was detected for models 1, 3 and 4 (NCV test p-values equaled respectively 6.57 × 10−6, 
6.30 × 10−6, 0.03) only robust standard errors were reported (the largest difference corresponded to 4 × 10−5). 
7 Candidates’ professionalism does no longer make a statistically significant difference in model 4. However, this 
can be due to the detected auto-correlation, cf. note 6. 
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To test these hypotheses, we use one more BCS question. We measure candidates’ 
support for allowing citizens to initiate a nationwide popular consultation in Belgium by asking 
on a five-point scale whether they ‘fully disagree’, ‘disagree’,  are ‘neutral’, ‘agree’, or ‘fully 
agree’ with the affirmation that “a certain number of citizens should be able to initiate a popular 
consultation on the federal level.” The question is then operationalized as dependent variable 
with three categories (supporting, being neutral, or opposing a nationwide popular 
consultation) and a multinomial logistic regression is used to test its potential association with 
candidates’ degree of criticalness toward representative democracy (operationalized as 
independent variable in this case). As control variables, we add again gender, age 
(continuous),8 and educational level (in four categories). 
The results in Table 12.3 indicate with at least 99.9% of confidence that candidates’ 
degree of criticalness has a statistically significant negative association with their support for a 
nationwide popular consultation. The probability to support a nationwide consultation indeed 
is much higher for critical candidates (78–89%) than for noncritical (7–18%).9 Equally, the 
probability to oppose a nationwide popular consultation is much higher for noncritical 
candidates (59–73%) than for critical (3–8%). This leads us to reject H5, confirm H6 and 
conclude that foremost critical candidates support direct democratic decision-making. 
Furthermore, difference in support for a nationwide consultation appears to be statistically 
significant for all control variables. The substantiveness of their differences varies, however. 10 
 
Table 12.3: Multinomial logistic regression results for candidates’ support for a nationwide popular 
consultation 
 Neutral vs. Supporting Std. error Neutral vs. Opposing Std. Error 
Intercept 4.72 *** 0.01  -0.50 *** 0.01 
Degree of criticalness  -0.18 *** 0.03   0.11 *** 0.03 
Age    -0.11 * 0.01  -0.03 *** 0.02 
Age²     0.01 0.01   0.01 *** 0.01 
Gender (F=1, M=0)  -0.29 *** 0.08  -0.45 *** 0.07 
Education (prim.)     
Secondary 0.31 *** 0.08 0.50 *** 0.06 
Bachelor  -0.11 *** 0.07    0.24 0.05 
Master 0.35 *** 0.06 0.64 *** 0.05 
p-values (>|t|): * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 – Akaike Inf. Crit.: 2217.077  
 
What does critical candidates’ support for direct democracy tell us? The literature on 
participatory democracy considers tools of direct democracy as an innovation (Smith 2009) 
and argues that the latter empower citizens and thereby improve democracy (Bouchard 2016). 
Criticalness of candidates toward representative democracy is in line with such findings if one 
considers that, by promoting direct democracy, critical candidates pay tribute to the critics of 
representative democracy. One should not forget that, at the same time, it might be precisely 
outsiders’ external position to the political system that enhances their capacity to criticize 
representative democracy. Also, one should keep in mind that driving democracy back to its 
origins through direct arrangements can become problematic when the unmediated will of the 
                                                 
8 We added its square since we found the relation to be curvilinear. 
9 The probability ranges for critical candidates correspond to a degree of criticalness of 0–4. For noncritical 
candidates, the probability ranges correspond to a degree of criticalness of 16–20. 
10 While female candidates appear to be slightly less probable (21%) to oppose a nationwide consultation then male 
(25%), candidates under 30 are more probable (85–93%) to support a nationwide consultation than are those over 
60 (3–10%). As for education, candidates with a Master’s appear to be slightly more probable (24%) to oppose a 
nationwide consultation than those with a Bachelor’s (23%), secondary (22%), or primary (18%) education.  
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people is supported by critical (populist) outsiders who deny the importance of institutional and 
constitutional restraints (Akkerman 2003, 156). 
 
To Be or Not to Be Critical: What Stakes for Democracy? 
 
At first glance, one might say that the presence of critical candidates alleviates the initially 
problematized democratic deficit, consisting in the discrepancy between citizens’ expectations 
and government performance. Some elites indeed join the side of those whose expectations 
are not met. In view of such a prospect, critical candidates would be the ones who substantially 
hear critical citizens and resound their voice. In fact, one could even go one step beyond and 
consider that Hirschman (1970)’s idea of ‘voice’ applies to critical candidates and that their 
criticalness is an attempt to repair the relationship (Norris [2011] would say the democratic 
deficit) with critical citizens. 
This idea is also close to the concept of ‘tribunician’ function by Lavau (1969). Parties 
and candidates who perform such a function offer some critical citizens the possibility of being 
defended and protected “against” the political system (Lavau 1969, 39). In such a perspective, 
critical candidates would be tribunician candidates disagreeing that legislation reflects the 
interests of the majority of citizens (41.90%) and that citizens have ample opportunities to 
participate in political decision-making (45.98%). Tribunician candidates would help in 
stabilizing the political system and the representative democracy. Indeed, following Lavau 
(1969, 19)’s conceptualization, the tribunician function leads to integration or neutralization of 
centrifugal forces. 
This conclusion is, although pertinent, somewhat misleading on its own. Candidates’ 
criticisms toward the functioning of representative democracy can be expected to put important 
challenges to the representative decision-making process and policy-making. While some 
critical candidates might question the system from within and think despite their criticisms that 
parties remain the essential link between citizens and the state (47.58%), others might want 
to challenge the system from outside and make even more radical (some say populist) claims 
for change (Akkerman 2003). 
The lack of citizen support for the functioning of democracy has been proven to create 
problems for the political mobilization (citizen participation), legitimacy (popular consent) and 
stability (compliance with the rule of law) of a country (Norris 2011). Taken together with the 
considerations mentioned before, this raises at least three equally problematic questions on 
candidates’ criticalness. First, what alternative do critical-outsider candidates put forward? 
Criticalness is constructive if it includes proposals for other democratic practices and 
experiences. Second, what would be the performance of candidates who are supposed to 
make a system work (if they are elected) while they do not support it? Third, seeing that even 
a large part of candidates is critical might worsen citizen’s satisfaction of representative  
democracy and deepen the already present democratic deficit (if citizens do not feel supported, 
cf. the beginning of the discussion). 
A predominant characteristic of noncritical candidates is their affiliation with a traditional 
party. It is among others the party discipline within traditional parties that can be expected to 
make candidates more compliant with the way democracy works. In a partitocracy, traditional 
parties have indeed developed as so-called ‘cartel parties’ (Katz and Mair 1995) who sought 
to remain in power by limiting political competition to managerial issues and thereby limiting 
criticalness as a whole. The dependency on the political system of professional candidates, 
who are previously elected candidates (living from and not for politics, [Weber 1919]), is 
12 
congruent with the process of cartelization. In this sense, candidates’ criticalness might above 
all come with their independence from this cartelization. 
Let us stress that our point is not to justify the change of current democratic institutions, 
nor to call on voting for those who want to. Indeed, one could validly argue that noncritical 
insider candidates come legitimately to power because citizens elect them. However, our 
findings invite to reconsider the domination of traditional parties facing critical candidates. By 
and large, representative democracy does not change despite criticism among a considerable 
number of both citizens and candidates. Is criticalness an answer to the democratic deficit? It 
is more certainly a way of improving democracy, the only political regime by now that has 
integrated criticism as an incentive for change. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Democracy is seen today almost unanimously as the most desirable form of government, yet 
the functioning of its institutions enjoy steadily less confidence. In this chapter, we have shown 
with the BCS database that this paradox, which has been observed for citizens over decades, 
does also hold for a significant part of electoral candidates. The findings of our analyses 
indicate that especially candidates who are outsiders to the representative democracy, i.e. 
nonprofessional, from nontraditional parties and without previous electoral mandate, are more 
critical toward the functioning of democracy. 
This chapter represents one of the first attempts to tackle the critical attitudes of political 
elites toward representative democracy. It mainly focused on the existence of critical 
candidates in the Belgian context, and the relation with the insider-outsider profile. However, 
this emerging research area warrant further inquiry in order to deeply understand the origins 
and the consequences of such a critical posture. Three directions of investigation could be 
envisioned. 
First, the practical consequences of the critical orientation could be investigated. Our research 
is based on an elite survey with Belgian electoral candidates. It provides insights into what 
political elites think about the functioning of the current representative system. Nevertheless, 
our study remains silent on what candidates actually do when they are (or not) critical. 
Research dealing with the candidates’ behaviors are then needed to analyze how critical 
opinion is translated (or not) into political actions inside and outside democratic institutions. 
The reactions of noncritical political elites warrant also research to investigate whether the 
political system 
reacts to the development of such criticisms among political elites. 
Second, we have adopted a synchronic approach of the degree of criticalness but more 
dynamic and diachronic analysis based on evolutions over time could also be developed. Do 
candidates change their mind, and if so, are these changes affected by election results and 
government participation? One could indeed expect critical candidates gaining responsible 
posts to become less critical toward the functioning of representative democracy. In order to 
test this hypothesis, a longitudinal research design would require both pre- and post-election 
survey research to analyze changes induced by election and government participation. These 
investigations could furthermore contribute to the analysis of the shift from an outsider position 
to an insider position. To what extent does exercising power change political elites? At 
individual (candidates) and meso (political parties) levels of analysis, is it still possible to have 
a critical position when being in office? This could also initiate a debate about the distinction 
between traditional and nontraditional parties. After how much time in office is a party no longer 
considered as a traditional one? 
13 
A last avenue for promising research concerns the link between critical candidates and 
critical citizens. This chapter is based on an analogy between citizens’ and elites’ attitudes  
toward the criticisms of current representative democracy. However, the link between both 
types of critical actors deserves more attention. Do critical citizens feel represented by critical 
candidates? Moreover, how do citizens perceive candidates’ critical posture whereas these 
candidates compete to exercise power in the current democratic system? 
The stakes for these questions to be resolved are high. Not only is it a matter of finding 
how to alleviate the already known democratic deficit between citizens and elites, but also 
about reinvigorating democracy, representative, or participatory, through constructive 
criticisms from both citizens and elites. 
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